Why the U

Why the U.S. involvements in Vietnam and Korea (and Iraq) were (and are) necessary...

by “Matlock” (RVN '67-'69)

It's been close to thirty-five years since I served in Vietnam. As I look back over those three-plus decades the importance of America's involvement in both the Korean and Vietnamese Wars has become clear. It was either Vietnam and Korea, or a third World War.

Now, I realize this opinion may not match the “popular” viewpoint of academicians and historians. That may be because we Americans often only look at the world through the American point of view and ignore the factors which affect our foes’ decision-making processes. However, if we try to look at the times through “Soviet eyes” and “American eyes” simultaneously, the events of 1950-1973 take a different perspective than the historians would have us believe.

Now, I’m not trying to condemn the academicians and historians. They based their opinions on the data at hand, and almost all of that data were generated in the West. Unfortunately, these opinions did not incorporate the information now available from the countries which comprised former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and recently declassified American documents. The demise of the USSR has presented the West with access both to Soviet documents which recorded the Soviet opinions and plans post-WWII through 1975, and personnel whose jobs were to devise Soviet strategic military plans.

The euphoria of 1946 brought by the end of World War II spawned a political polarization of the Allied Forces. The USSR (Russia and its conquered subordinates) and Mainland China went one way as communist; America and Western Europe another as capitalists. This political schism initiated a Russian-controlled imperialism and a Chinese isolationism. Meanwhile, the West concentrated on its economic recovery from the ravages of war.

The division between the Communist and Capitalist societies continued to quickly grow. World leaders recognized the growing militarism of the two Communist superpowers – the USSR and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Fear of Communist imperialism beyond the USSR and PRC borders led to the formation of several military alliances, with the more recognizable being the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954. That fear proved to be justified.

The Korean peninsula found itself to be the first full-scale test of the military resolve of the Communists and the Capitalists. The Communists came forward with a tactical doctrine which stressed overwhelming the Capitalist forces by brute-force-in-numbers. Many a Korean veteran have told the tale of there being more charging Chinese than there were bullets to stop them. The PRC was the Communist antagonist in this conflict, providing the logistics and much of the manpower for Communist military machine. North Korean and Chinese losses were staggering, yet their tactical doctrine never changed. Never being able to break the United Nations forces led by the United States, the Communists eventually halted their assault. The end result could best be considered a stalemate which still officially exists as a "Cease-Fire."

The latter 1950's brought forth what was described as a "cold war" among nations. Cold turned to hot in Southeast Asia as the Vietnamese sought to rid themselves of the French Colonialists. The USSR and PRC teamed to provide all of the military logistical support to the Vietnamese forces under Ho Chi Minh. This war later changed from being a perceived Vietnamese struggle for independence to what could be called the ultimate BETA test of Communist versus Capitalist military power and resolve.

With the withdrawal of the French, Vietnam became split into North and South. The South attempted to form a capitalistic democratic government while the North went communist. Ho Chi Minh, a devout Communist and the most recognized personality in Vietnam, became the leader of the North. He prescribed a unification of Vietnam under communism. Fueled by total USSR and PRC logistical support, North Vietnam sought this unification via a military solution.

The logistical support provided by USSR and PRC to North Vietnam did not come without conditions. Russian and Chinese military advisors and observers permeated the North Vietnamese forces and were involved in the formation and execution of strategic and tactical doctrine. While the North Vietnamese may have been motivated by idealism, the USSR and PRC had their own agenda - 1) to acquire strategic bases from which to control the seaways from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean; and 2) to test out weaponry and tactics against the American-led forces with “expendable” forces. The concept of "no free lunch" also applies to the subsidizing of a military action by an outsider to the conflict.

As the Vietnam War expanded due to total USSR/PRC logistical support and the United States' direct military intervention, the situation in Europe was also getting hotter. The build-up of forces by the USSR and NATO on both sides of the Iron Curtain gave fear to the outbreak of World War III. Both sides were constantly engaged in Corps and Division-level military maneuvers, often within sight of each other. There were constant political and diplomatic battles between USSR and NATO members, and the potential of escalation of these wars-of-words to military actions was real. Several times throughout the 1960's Europe saw both USSR and NATO forces at wartime alert status.

The question is, why didn't the USSR and NATO go to war in Europe? The conditions were ripe for another European war. The military armament was there. The antagonism existed. The politicians were always saber-rattling. What kept World War III from happening?

My belief is that the military experiences of Vietnam and Korea prevented the Soviets from attacking Europe.

To understand why the Soviets never left the Iron Curtain borders, we must look at the situation as would a Soviet military strategist. The Soviet attack doctrine for Europe was long known as involving a “blitzkrieg” type of attack via an immense force spearheaded mainly through Germany’s “Fulda Gap” region. To support this thrust, the Soviets would have to rely on long logistical support lines and captured Allied military stockpiles. As the Soviet logistics lines would be spread thin, the Soviets were potentially vulnerable to an Allied flanking counterattack from both the Northern side through Scandinavia and the Southern side through Iran (a US ally at that time).

In order to neutralize a Southern side counterattack, the Soviet Navy would have to be able to control the approaches to Iran via the Indian Ocean. In order to do this, the Soviet Navy needed to control the sea lanes entering the Indian Ocean. Such a task required military naval bases in the South China Sea - an area within the naval logistical support range of the Soviets through existing bases along the Western Pacific Ocean.

From the Soviet perspective, a USA/NATO Southern Side counterattack required open sea lanes from the USA West Coast, Australia, Japan, South Korea and The Philippines in order to logistically support such a military action. If the Soviets could obtain control of South Vietnam - strategically well-located for naval opeerations - then the Soviets could individually gain control over Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, resulting in total military domination of the sea lanes entering the Indian Ocean from the USA’s logistical centers.

The People’s Republic of China’s position throughout this time was one of strategic patience. Peking did not care if Moscow wanted Europe. Peking knew that the USSR could not militarily or administratively sustain itself in Southeast Asia for any considerable period of time, and eventually Peking would inherit Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia and the rest due mainly to Soviet inability to maintain control over these entities.

Historians have continually discounted the “Domino Theory” of a Communist Southeast Asia takeover because the belief was the Communists were intent solely on spreading their socioeconomic ideology. The “Domino Theory” was totally realistic and necessary when viewed as a Soviet military doctrine to support a European invasion. That was the only way the Soviets could insure control of those prized sea lanes.

When we look at the military history of the Vietnam War, it becomes obvious that Vietnam was never about winning or losing, but rather about preventing an expansion of Soviet military control over a highly strategic location.

As mentioned earlier, Vietnam was also the BETA test site for Soviet doctrine and weaponry. History has recorded that despite unlimited USSR/PRC logistical support, training and assistance, the North Vietnamese forces sustained manpower losses of over a million soldiers. Additionally, while there were battles where the North Vietnamese forces had some military success, these successes were extremely rare and never sustained to any degree. So, the Communist's tactical force-on-force doctrine - the doctrine the USSR trained its forces to apply in potential European-initiated war - failed in Vietnam to defeat the corresponding American military doctrine, just as that same Communist military doctrine had failed in Korea. Ironically, the Soviet’s later experience in Afghanistan again proved that Soviet tactics were of marginal success against a guerilla force.

As to North Vietnam's eventual success in achieving a unified Vietnam under Communism, one must examine the differences between Korean and Vietnam for how that happened. In the Korean Conflict, a "Cease-Fire" occurred which has lasted for forty-five years due mainly to the forceful military presence of American troops in South Korea and the dedication of the South Koreans into maintaining well-trained and well-equipped armed forces. On the other hand, South Vietnam, after several decades of continuous and destructive warfare and governmental ineptness, lost the will to continue a war within its borders.

Meanwhile, Soviet military analysts learned several valuable lessons while using North Vietnamese as cannon-fodder. This knowledge amplified the high risk of a potential military failure in Europe. The first of these lessons was that the American/Allied military forces were much better equipped, disciplined and trained than their Soviet counterparts. As a result, the Soviet brute-force-of-numbers doctrine, whether in small unit engagements or force-on-force match-ups, had little hope of ultimately defeating American/Allied forces.

The second lesson was that America and its Allies would indeed utilize its military force when threatened or to retaliate, and that a Soviet staging-to-war may bring the NATO forces to launch a preemptive strike against the Soviets. While America's long-term political/social resolve was obviously questionable, America’s willingness to immediately respond to a military challenge was demonstrated time after time. Also, the combat capability of the American military was exceptional, and proved it could withstand any Soviet full-scale aggression.

The third lesson was that the American forces were well led. For as long as the Vietnam War lasted, the American military maintained a policy of rotating troops after one-year tours-in-combat. That policy had provided the American forces in Europe and the military reserves both stateside and OCONUS with a seasoned cadre of combat-tested and experienced leaders at all levels command - from fire team leaders to Corps commanders. Any military analyst knows that it is one thing to confront an opponent having little-to-no combat experience; and another thing altogether to engage an opponent whose leaders, tactics, equipment and front-line personnel are battle-tested.

The fourth lesson was that the only military option left to the Communists against the West, should the USSR conduct a preemptive attack, was the nuclear one. Since the West's nuclear arsenal was the Soviet’s equal, a nuclear battle would have resulted in mutual annihilation and a devastated planet - hardly a victory in anyone's opinion!

There are many who believe that the American military lost the Vietnam War because South Vietnam is now unified into a communist-run nation. This is a short-sighted and unrealistic opinion which does not take into account any of the military circumstances and actions of the times. Such an opinion does not recognize the obvious - had the United States not intervened in Vietnam, as it had in Korea, there probably would have been another World War initiated in Europe.

To my fellow Vietnam Veterans, to all Korean Conflict veterans, and also to the new generation of Mideast veterans - be proud! The veterans' deeds and sacrifices have given mankind; 1) almost sixty years without a world war; 2) time to allow for a reduction in the potential of nuclear disaster; 3) the opportunity to witness the demise of the Communism from a global threat to that of a regional cultism; and 4) the hope that international terrorism initiated due to ideological differences may not be the next catalyst to global disaster.

The Mideast (Iraq and Afghanistan) War is essentially no different than Vietnam and Korea. There is a major ideological difference between the combatants. People have been and are still being killed because of that ideological difference. The potential for global warfare occurring due to the ideological difference is very real. And, unless all efforts are taken to mitigate these differences - militarily and sociologically - hell on earth can still happen.

The real “weapon of mass destruction” is governmental apathy when faced with severe and imminent danger to the citizenry - ask Neville Chamberlain!

Being a Vietnam, Korean or Mideast veteran is to have an inner pride in knowing the world is a safer place because of our actions. The facts show those who served in uniform during those terrible times indeed saved this planet from the hell of another world war and continue to do so. May we never forget those who gave the ultimate sacrifice to allow us the chance for these reflections.

...Matlock //Combat Veterans Motorcycle Association//

EPILOGUE: The opinions expressed within this article are mine alone. They are based on thirty-plus years of trying to understand the “why” behind the actions of all the Vietnam War major participants.